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Abstract
This article discusses the European military helicopter market. It first recalls historical antecedents in the structural
development of the main helicopter programs that helped to consolidate the industry and then reviews the industry’s current
major trends. A paradoxical situation is identified: While European countries presently are able to cope with both, the growing
needs in helicopter capabilities and the maintenance of ageing fleets, no large helicopter programs for the future have been
launched. Some uncertainties regarding how future helicopter procurement will be organized are identified. The current
situation underlines the challenges that European states will face to maintain both industrial skills in the industry and
sovereignty in military helicopter capabilities. A number of industry options are discussed: more exports, more cooperation,
more dual use, and more reliance on support and service sales.
M
ilitary helicopters have become a major defense
system, and states use them extensively in military
operations. Helicopters—for combat, transport, or
multirole uses—provide modularity and flexibility to project
forces at home and abroad. Due to certain operating
characteristics, e.g., the ability to take off and land vertically,
hover for extended periods of time, and aircraft handling
properties at low-speed, these weapons platforms are used to
conduct missions that are not possible with other aircraft.
Military needs for the use of helicopters are diverse. They now
are used in escort missions, support missions, and ground force
protection in conjunction with fixed-wing aircraft. Since the
1950s, military helicopters have become a key element of air
mobility, based on the dual-named “terrestrial/rotary-wing”
concept, the combination of being able to transport ground
units carrying out operations while supporting them with
scouting, transport, or combat capabilities. Depending on the
type of mission (payload, distance to cover, and so on),
helicopters have progressively become an alternative to
manned fixed-wing aircraft.1
European countries involved in military operations use
helicopters extensively. For example, French armed forces
recently asked for a significant reinforcement with helicopters
forces for the Barkhane operation in the Sahel sub-Saharan
region. This involved a mix of Tiger (5 years old in 2016) and
Gazelle (30 years old) combat helicopters as well as Puma (41
years old) and Cougar (25 years old) transport helicopters.
On the demand side, the need for aero mobility has
increased. Military helicopters are among Europe’s
procurement priorities. This is especially true for transport
helicopters, with 14 countries engaged in a purchasing or
upgrading process since 2011. However, many uncertainties
exist that affect this market’s evolution. For instance, defense
budgets are constrained and military helicopters require large
investments in terms of acquisition and ongoing support. This
requires constant examination of this industry in Europe.2
On the supply side, competition is fierce. The estimated
world-wide market is about 1,000 platforms annually, with the
American market representing roughly 66 percent of the total.
In 2016, the market was shared among three American, two
European (Airbus Helicopters and Leonardo Helicopters), and
one Russian (Russian Helicopters, part of Oboronprom)
manufacturers. In addition, two Japanese, one Indian, and one
Chinese firm produce licensed platforms developed by the
American, European, and Russian firms.3
In what follows, the two main sections of this article
discuss, first, the history and current situation of consolidation
in the European military helicopter industry and, second,
options for its future. A final section concludes.
History and current situation
Prior to world war two, helicopter development took place in
European countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
the United Kingdom. While the German Focke-Wulf FW-61
was the first operational helicopter to fly, in 1936, European
production numbers were low. The first helicopter to reach
industrial scale production was the American Sikorsky R-4,
with a production order for around 100 aircraft in 1942, and it
was the only Allied helicopter to serve in world war two. After
the war, the transfer of U.S. helicopter technology through
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licensing agreements led to the emergence of four major
European manufacturers: Westland (U.K.), Aerospatiale
(France), Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm MBB (Germany),
and Agusta (Italy). Today only two European manufacturers
remain, Airbus Helicopters and Leonardo Helicopters. Table 1
lists them in the context of the world’s major manufacturers
and shows various market and business indicators. In 2015, the
two European firms shared half of the market in Europe, the
three American manufacturers had 38 percent, and the Russian
one had 10 percent. Airbus Helicopters produced 38 percent of
all platforms in service in 2016 and Leonardo Helicopters 11
percent.4 
French-British bilateral initiatives: The take-off of industrial
integration
In 1915, the English town of Yeovil was known both for its
gloving industry (glove production) and for its Petters diesel
engine company. Petters placed its facilities and workforce at
the government’s disposal for the war effort. When it was
suggested that the local sewing skills in the gloving industry,
combined with Petters engineering, could be adapted to aircraft
production, Westland was born. Following the war, the new
firm designed a number of civil aircraft and, during the second
world war, produced military aircraft (e.g., Lysander, Spitfire,
Welkin). Between 1915 and 1955, a total of about 6,000 fixed-
wing aircraft were built at Yeovil.5
In 1946 Westland negotiated a long-term agreement to
build Sikorsky helicopters under license and made the strategic
decision to specialize in the production of rotary-wing
platforms. In the Royal Navy helicopters rapidly superseded
fixed-wing aircraft in anti-submarine warfare and search and
rescue operations. In 1960, twenty British aircraft
manufacturers combined to form only two major aircraft
manufacturing groups, the British Aircraft Corporation and the
Hawker Siddeley Group. For rotary-wing platforms, Westland
took the lead and successively acquired Bristol Helicopters,
Fairey Aviation, and Saunders-Roe to to become Westland
Helicopters, Britain’s sole helicopter company. The partnership
with Sikorsky continued with the production of the Sea King
line of models.
Cautious French-British cooperation in the production of
military helicopters started with an agreement struck in 1965.
The needs were for tactical and transport helicopters and for a
light observation and multirole helicopter (including for anti-
submarine warfare and antitank missions). This gave birth to
the Puma, Gazelle, and Lynx programs and was, for Westland,
an important step in its development to become a major
European helicopter company. Westland took on the design
leadership for the Lynx, while the French partner, Aerospatiale,
was responsible for Puma and Gazelle. Both companies,
















- Airbus Helicopters (French, German, Spanish)






























Russia: Russian Helicopters 90 42,000 3.5 371 10
Japan
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries











India: Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 95 c n/a n/a 0 0
China: Changhe Aircraft Industries Corporation n/a 4,300 n/a 0 0
Sources: Compiled from James (2016), Meddah (2016), SIPRI (2016), and manufacturers’ data. Notes: a The number of platforms is for
2016 (IISS, 2016). b The figure is the turnover Boeing Defense, Space, and Security only. c The figure is for the entire company. n/a: Not
available.
THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND SECURITY JOURNAL DROFF, The European military helicopter industry     p. 22
Vol. 12, No. 1 (2017) | doi:10.15355/epsj.12.1.20
The Economics of Peace and Security Journal  —  ISSN 1749-852X  —  http://www.epsjournal.org.uk 
© EPS Publishing, 2017. All rights reserved. For permissions, email: ManagingEditor@epsjournal.org.uk
however, were to take part in the development and manufacture
of all platforms. The three helicopter types have been
extensively used by both countries in domestic and foreign
operations—many of them are still in service—and were great
export successes as well. (For example, more than 1,750
Gazelles were produced, and in past or current use by 27
countries.) Today, however, ageing and obsolescence raises
maintenance cost and limits interoperability with other nations’
military assets.6
Italian-British initiative: The birth of AgustaWestland
In the mid-1970s, Westland decided to design a larger aircraft,
the Westland 30, as a private venture for the civilian market. In
part because of the limited success of these aircraft, the mid-
1980s proved a difficult time for Westland and the firm
considered a major link-up with Sikorsky, although European
option was preferred. A partnership with Aerospatiale was
envisioned but abandoned. In the end, Westland agreed with
Agusta of Italy to collaborate on the production of a new
helicopter—the AW-101 Merlin—which was to replace the
Sea King. In 1986, Sikorsky acquired Westland. Then, in 1994,
Westland became a wholly owned subsidiary of GKN, a
British multinational automotive and aerospace company.
Westland was merged with then-Finmeccanica’s Agusta
helicopter division in 2001. Finally, in 2004, Finmeccanica
S.p.A. acquired GKN’s share in the joint venture. As from
2016, the company is called Leonardo Helicopters.
The AW-101 Merlin program was launched by the United
Kingdom to respond to national requirements for a modern
naval utility helicopter. In 1974 already, the Royal Air Force
and the Royal Navy had wanted to replace Westland’s Sea
Kings. Westland first proposed its own platform, derived from
a civilian helicopter, but it was not selected. Meanwhile, in
Italy, Agusta had joined a program in 1980 to replace the
Agusta-Sikorsky AS-61 which was in service in Italy. Agusta
and Westland then formed a joint venture, called Elicoterri
Helicopter Industries (EHI), which gave birth to the AW-101
Merlin and subsequently played an important role in the
integration of Agusta and Westland. The AW-101 entered into
service in 1999. This medium-lift transport helicopter was
initially developed for both military and civilian markets. A
version was also developed for anti-submarine warfare. The
platform has been deployed in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2016, 98 platforms were in service in 4 European countries
(Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the U.K. 
French-German cooperation: The EC-665 Tiger program and
the birth of Eurocopter (Airbus Helicopters)
To replace ageing Bo-105, Gazelle, and Puma helicopters,
France and Germany started in 1974 to cooperate to produce a
combat helicopter with anti-tank and night vision capabilities.
Sud Aviation (later merged in Aerospatiale) and MBB had
already worked together in the 1960s on a new rotor and
composite blades, but not on a whole system. Moreover,
following cooperation failures on European fighter aircraft and
battle tanks, by the early 1980s the Tiger program appeared to
be the only opportunity to cooperate with Germany. The Tiger
program was exemplary in that all procurement segments were
shared between countries. It also gave birth to joint training
schools, both for pilots—training is particularly expensive in
aeronautics—and maintenance personnel. In 2016, 97
platforms were in service in three European countries (France,
Germany, and Spain) and in Australia (22 platforms).
In 1992 DASA (Germany) and Aerospatiale (France)
merged their helicopter divisions into a new company,
Eurocopter. In 2000, both groups agreed to merge and this
consolidation included CASA (Spain), with its helicopter
business (mainly producing Bo-105s under license) being
integrated into Eurocopter. Eventually EADS rebranded itself
and all its divisions, and Eurocopter change its name to Airbus
Helicopters in 2014. By 2016 Airbus Helicopters had four main
facilities in Europe (two each in France and Germany), plus 32
subsidiaries and other operations around the world.
The AW-101 Merlin and Tiger programs played a major
role in the integration of Europe’s military helicopter industry.
AgustaWestland and Eurocopter emerged due to convergence
between operational needs for different armed forces and a
desire for industrial rationalization. The cooperative programs
were an opportunity for firms to build concrete foundations to
work together, share skills, knowledge, and infrastructure. This
gave birth to what today are two leading European military
helicopter companies, Leonardo Helicopters and Airbus
Helicopters.
European multilateral programs
In addition to the (mostly) bi-lateral programs already
described, recent multilateral programs such as NH-90
illustrate the limits of European industry consolidation.
Helicopters are part of today’s strategic defense equipment. In
the absence of any large, multi-nation, cooperative program to
develop new military helicopters platforms in Europe, a major
risk lies in the potential loss of defense industrial and
technological knowledge, skills, and military capabilities. This
article discusses the potential roles that export expansion,
increased cooperation, dual-use production, or a focus on
support and services may have in keeping European military
helicopter firms “in play.”
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Contrary to programs such as the AW-101 Merlin or Tiger, the
NH-90 program had limited effects on integration.
Joint efforts on the NH-90 platform began in late 1970s. As
suggested by its name—NATO Helicopter 90—NATO needs
influenced this program, which was a response to the main
requirements of the so-called Ditchley Park agreements:
building a medium transport and multirole helicopter, also
capable of operations in naval environments. The NH-90 was
developed and manufactured by NH Industries, an industrial
cooperation of Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo, and Fokker
Aerostructures.7 The program involves several countries. On
the supply side, R&D and production costs were shared among
four countries: France, Germany, and Italy carried around 30
percent each and the Netherlands 6 percent. Belgium and
Portugal contributed to production costs only, at about 1.5
percent each. Given the total cost, it is likely that the countries
would not have been able to afford a platform with such strong
technological innovation. On the demand side, as of 2016 a
total of thirteen states have placed more than 500 orders for the
NH-90. Two versions—one marine, one terrestrial—have been
developed.
While impressive, the program has its limits. First, in early
service, the NH-90 suffered from technical set-backs, which in
turn delayed active deployment by some operators. Second,
because of lack of rationalization in terms of the needs of
national armies, the NH-90 today is in service in 23 versions,
which limits rationalization of maintenance. Third, in the
production process itself, little industrial rationalization is
noted. Because of the application of juste retour, assembly
lines are spread across several countries. Fourth, no merger
between industrial actors in the European helicopter industry
have taken place during, or after, the scheduling of this
program. Contrary to the experiences of the AW-101 Merlin
and Tiger programs, for instance, the NH-90 program did not
have an effect on Europe-wide military helicopter industry
consolidation. 
Lack of new European military helicopters programs
Europe’s military helicopter fleets are ageing. A proxy for
aging is the date of entry into service. Thus, by 2016, the oldest
helicopters are the Bell-204 and Bell-205 Iroquois (first flight
in 1956; entry in service in 1959), with a total of 367 platforms
in service. The youngest fleet is the AW-159 (first flight in
2009; entry in service in 2015), with a total of 49 platforms in
service. Around two-thirds of Europe’s military helicopter
platforms are based on designs that are more than 35 years old.
More precisely, of a total of 3,586 platforms the oldest
helicopters (defined here as pre-1980 entry into service)
represent 65 percent  of the number of helicopters in service in
2016. Another 11 percent came into service between 1980 and
1990, 14 percent between 1990 and 2000, and the remaining 10
percent since then. This age profile and the increasing demand
for helicopter capabilities have led to discussions regarding
new helicopter programs and replacement solutions.
In Europe, no new common, large programs, such as Tiger
or NH-90, are currently planned. In the United States, the Joint
Multi-Role Program Helicopter (a multirole platform with
vertical take-off, highspeed, and tiltrotor) groups major
American manufacturers—Bell, Sikorsky, and Boeing—to
develop a demonstrator, which is supposed to fly in 2017. The
U.S. also launched a large program of about USD100 billion to
replace several ageing platforms including the Chinook, Black
Hawk, and Apache. This prompted the acquisition of Sikorsky
by Lockheed Martin in 2015 because the latter firm wanted to
penetrate the helicopter market. (A demonstrator was built.) In
Europe, to avoid dependency on American systems, it would
be of interest to take a similar approach to the development of
new capabilities and base them on Airbus Helicopters and
Leonardo Helicopters, and possibly other countries with which
two majors have developed industrial cooperation such as
Poland, Spain, or even Turkey.
However, Europe appears to be focused on national
initiatives, where several helicopter replacement programs
have recently been launched. In 2013, in France, the Ministry
of Defense has set up a Joint Light Helicopter program
(Hélicoptère Interarmées Léger, HIL). This program aims to
develop a family of helicopters based on a dual-use platform.
Several versions with different specifications would be put into
service in the different services of the armed forces and other
government departments (e.g., police and customs). Because of
budget cuts and changes in budget planning, the program has
been delayed. The platform is not expected to be in operation
before 2020-2022. In Italy, in late 2016, Parliament’s defense
committee approved a funding envelope of EUR487 million to
design and develop the successor to the 1980s flagship of
AgustaWestland’s production, the AW-129 Mangusta attack
helicopter (first flight in 1983; 43 platforms in service in Italy
in 2016). The design phase of the new platform will involve
universities and research centers and the prototype will be built
at Leonardo Helicopters’s Vergiate factory. The new helicopter
will replace the army’s AW-129 Mangusta in 2020. The
platform has be announced as “all-Italian,” but this seems
unlikely as Italy does not have an appropriate engine producer
in Italy and missiles will have to be sourced from foreign
suppliers since the only ones produced in Italy are under
foreign license and thus subject to re-export controls.
In short, Europe faces a paradoxical situation: Helicopters
are among the most extensively used pieces of equipment in
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military operations today but there exists a lack of large, new
programs to address future needs and capabilities. The support
of states with large equipment programs (upgrading,
retrofitting, or developing new platforms) is crucial. In spite of
a history of major military helicopter programs, nothing
comparable to current U.S. efforts is found in Europe. The
situation is nationally based and only national programs are
launched in the light helicopters segment such as multirole and
multi-mission platforms to replace ageing light platforms.
There is a substantial risk of losing industrial skills and
knowledge dearly acquired by European firms and countries
between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s.
The future of Europe’s helicopter defense industrial base
The following subsection review four options that European
military helicopter firms and countries may consider.
Exports: Is the future outside Europe?
In the current context (declining defense budgets make purely
domestic programs unaffordable; no new large expected multi-
country, cooperative programs), cooperative ventures aimed at
exports could enlarge the market, maintain industrial skills, and
also further industrial integration. But market competition is
intense, involves many uncertainties and, depending on the
type of export or cooperation, one can also see risks for some
strategic skills to leave Europe.
First, European manufacturers can search for export
markets in Europe, outside their own domestic market. East
European countries are potential candidates, for exports and for
joint work. They have growing defense budgets and growing
needs in helicopter capabilities (they perceive threats from
Russia). For example, Poland needs to replace its ageing
Russian platforms, which constitute more than 60 percent of
the total number of platforms in service in the country in 2016.
The Polish market for 70 multi-mission helicopters is valued at
EUR2 billion. Airbus recently lost the Polish market for its
EC-725 Caracal when Poland selected 21 Sikorsky S-70 Black
Hawk helicopters. Poland also launched a tender for 30 attack
helicopters. The choice will be between the Airbus Tiger,
Boeing AH-64, and Leonardo Helicopter’s AW-129. Another
call for tenders has been launched for around 20 special forces
helicopters with an offset requirement concerning in-country
maintenance of selected platforms. Again, Sikorsky, Airbus
Helicopters, and Leonardo Helicopters are in the competition.
Many uncertainties cloud these tenders and last minute changes
of terms complicate the picture but the strong suggestion is that
a European procurement preference should not be presumed to
hold for some countries such as Poland for example. This is
unlike the case of northern European countries (e.g., Finland,
Netherlands, Norway) that clearly have selected the NH-90
helicopter to modernize their fleets.
Cooperation
A second option is to intensify the current degree of integration
and gain access to new markets while preserving skills and
knowledge. But what are the prospects? A merger between
Airbus Helicopters and Leonardo Helicopters is unlikely since
this would lead to the creation of a civilian helicopter
monopoly in Europe. Programs with Russia (e.g., in the heavy
transport helicopter segment or even for attack helicopters) or
China (an attractive but embargoed market) also are unlikely
in the current context. A transatlantic venture is difficult to
realize as the prospects for European platforms in the U.S.
market are more limited for military than for civilian platforms.
The former Aerospatiale did sell some civilian platforms in the
U.S. and today, in its legal form of American Eurocopter (the
subsidiary of Airbus Group in North America), the
manufacturer continues to deliver the UH-72A Lakota (a
militarized version of the EC-145, produced in Mississippi) to
the U.S. Army. However this is an exception as the Pentagon’s
market has been hard for European manufacturers to break into
(in competition with Bell Helicopters). One should not expect
that the military platforms of Airbus Helicopters (e.g., Tiger or
NH-90) will make it in the U.S. market.8
Regarding Leonardo Helicopters, the VH-71 Kestrel (an
adapted version of the AW-101), was developed in cooperation
between Lockheed Martin and AgustaWestland to serve in the
U.S. presidential transport fleet. The European firm was chosen
because, at the time, the American one did not have industrial
skills in the design of military helicopters and was more of an
electronics specialist dealing with onboard systems and
systems integration. However, the program was cancelled due
to its expense (more than four billion dollars for nine
platforms). This could have been the first step toward a merger
between Leonardo and Lockheed Martin, but it failed.
Leonardo is also a partner of Bell Helicopters (i.e., Boeing) to
develop the AW-609 with a tiltrotor taken from the Boeing-
Bell V-22 military helicopter (expected on the market in 2018).
A transatlantic company is unlikely to emerge. Recall that
in 2015 Sikorsky was acquired by Lockheed Martin. It is
conceivable that AgustaWestland or Airbus Helicopters might
have done the acquisition, but neither did. Instead, Lockheed
Martin burst into the helicopter sector, even without industrial
consolidation at the U.S. national level. If one looks beyond an
American option, new partnerships in emerging or developing
countries need to be examined. Airbus Helicopters currently
exports to (and produces in) Asia. China is a major market for
civilian and para-public helicopters (Airbus cooperates on
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civilian models, for example the H-175), and India is a defense
market. Further, Airbus Helicopter has developed a partnership
with South Korea (the KAI Surion, based on a Super Puma
platform) and signed contracts to sell its EC-725 Caracal to
Thailand and Singapore. Airbus Helicopters is also increasing
its exports to Kuwait (30 Caracal), Qatar (which is expected to
finalize a contract for the purchase of 22 NH-90), Brazil
(Caracal), and Mexico (NH-90).9
For its part, Leonardo has developed partnerships to
produce its new generation of helicopters with, for example,
Turkey (mainly for civilian platforms) and Poland (at the PZL
Ðwidnik plant) and it is also interested in the African market:
The firm recently concluded a joint venture in Algeria (Aïn
Arnat) to produce light and medium helicopters (transport,
Search and Rescue, and scouting).
Cooperation in its various forms makes it possible to
maintain industrial skills and knowledge, true, but in the long
run there is a risk for strategic skills, although maintained in
the short term, to be off-shored. Ultimately, this would weaken
both European firms and states in the helicopter sector.
Dual-use helicopters
Militarized versions of civilian helicopter platforms—dual-use
helicopters—may offer several acquisition and support-related
advantages. First, sharing the same basic platform, both
versions share design and R&D costs and come off the same
assembly line. The resulting economies of scale spread out the
fixed costs and therefore reduce unit acquisition costs. Second,
economies of scale also increase the efficiency with which
spare parts can be supplied, thus lowering support costs. Third,
availability of relatively inexpensive spare parts can contribute
to decreased helicopter downtime, again saving costs.10
Since European helicopter firms are less dependent on
military markets (their average military sales dependence is 45
percent) than their American competitors (80 percent), dual use
would seem a good option. In addition, the macroeconomic
context also matters. For their civilian platforms, the European
firms struggle to cope with decreased demand from the oil and
gas sectors of the economy. Oil companies represent around
half of Airbus Helicopters civilian sales, for example, and no
orders were received from this segment of the market in 2015.
Leonardo Helicopters, likewise, faces an unfavorable civilian
market, although it did have some commercial success with its
latest civilian platform, the AW-189. Moreover, European
helicopter manufacturers already tend to militarize civilian
platforms. The H-145 of Airbus, for instance, initially built for
the police, has been militarized and sold to Germany and the
Royal Navy of Thailand. In Italy, the HH-139A is a militarized
version of the AW-139 civilian platform and is mainly used for
search-and-rescue tasks on national territory. And the French
future Joint Light Helicopter (the HIL program) will probably
be based on a civilian platform designed by Airbus
Helicopters.
But can one use militarized versions of civilian helicopters
in combat? What in fact are the costs of militarizing a civilian
platform and are they less than those of the development of a
purely military platform? Military and civilian platforms differ
in several ways. First, helicopters for military use need more
protection. If passive protection (stealth, armored protection)
is too hard to add to a civilian platform, active protection can
be arranged for with add-on kits (self-defense systems, sensors,
missiles). For example, the AB-212 helicopter was based on
civilian standards but is now a combat unit with self-defense
systems and in use by Italy’s armed forces. Second, weight and
load capability play an important role in dual-use helicopter
configurations. Third, the use of dual-use helicopters is less
effective and efficient for combat mission with ballistic contact
than it is for logistical and tactical transport missions.
More broadly speaking, military, security, and civilian
users have different needs on three linked dimensions:
requirements, price-quality relationship, and time to market.
The militarization of a civilian platform is usually a long,
complex, and costly process. Armed forces often seek to
replace several existing platforms with a single new one. The
problem here is that this entails an increase in the number of
specifications that are linked to various (and sometimes
contradictory) operational and mission needs, and this leads to
a more complex and costly platforms, both in acquisition and
maintenance. Dual-use helicopters appear better-suited to
sovereign missions that are not purely military but more on the
security end of the defense–security continuum or to training
tasks (e.g., the U.K.’s Defence Helicopter Flying School or
France’s outsourcing of training fleets).11
Of course, one can reverse the question and ask about
adapting a military platform to civilian purpose. Many
interesting cases can be found in recent history. The Puma and
Super Puma helicopters have civilian versions for transport,
and many civilian operators use the AW-101 platform for
passenger transport. A platform designed to basic military
specifications could then remove, case by case, everything that
is not in accordance with civilian customer requirements.
The key role of services in helicopter fleet support
For helicopter manufacturers, the aftermarket or MRO industry
(Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) has become an important
component of the value chain. MRO provides support to users
through day-to-day maintenance and required upgrades. Given
the lack of investment in new large military programs, a source
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for both future growth and sustained industrial know-how thus
lies in extended support of the existing fleets. This should also
appeal to governments: As systems have become more costly
to buy, keeping ageing fleets in service longer would contain
cost and raise readiness. “All-inclusive MRO solutions” with
flight hour contracts, in-support service contracts, performance
contracts, and so on, are appealing. (And in this the helicopter
industry would follow a trend already well-established in other
industries: Sell the follow-on service more than the platform.)
For example, Airbus Helicopters won a training contract
from the British Ministry of Defence for about GBP500 million
on a fleet of 32 helicopters—29 H-135 and 3 H-145—with
MRO services included (over 17 years to supply 28,000 hours
of training each year). This activity is growing and the
company currently provides military helicopter training
services for the Royal Air Force at Shawbury, England (38
Squirrel and 14 Griffin helicopters). In 2015, service activities
represented almost half of Airbus Helicopters’ turnover, a
figure that is expected to increase in future.12
Already such an evolution toward services is more fully
developed in the civilian market (e.g., Ubercopter). Innovations
in this sector will probably affect the military sector in years to
come. This opens up new market perspectives for European
helicopter firms who have produced half of the platforms
currently in service (by 2016) and who, according to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, are expected to
fulfill some 92 percent of future European helicopter orders.
Needless to say, original manufacturers will be better placed
than competitors to offer tied-in service packages to their
military customers.13
Cooperation in MRO will increase in the future and become
a crucial issue. Since Europe has not been able to launch and
support a common program in the field of military helicopters,
cooperation, at least in the short to medium term, is an
opportunity to reduce costs and raise platforms readiness. This
might be seen as a bottom-up approach for building European
defense. Cooperation in maintenance leads to agreements to
share stocks of spare parts and of specialized tools and
infrastructure, the exchange of specialized workforces, and
improved economies of scale by negotiating larger contracts as
well as in the training of joint units. Recent European
experiences, including the NH-90 and Tiger programs,
illustrate the various combinations of possible pooling in the
area of support. That said, Tiger helicopter cooperation could
be improved with, for example, joint purchases to create a
European pooled fleet shared by France, Germany, and Spain.
One should also think of concentrating training on a dedicated
site instead of using two schools, one in France and the other
in Germany.14
The European Defense Agency (EDA) is particularly
involved in the area of cooperation. In the helicopter sector, it
launched a pooling and sharing initiative for skills, knowledge,
and experience among European countries with the objective
to lower the cost of training through multinational exercises,
annual symposia, and training of multinational formations.
Between 2009 and 2016, some 206 helicopters, 1,320 aircrew
members, and 10,000 infantry deployed to the exercises, held
in Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. During this time
period, 590 aircrews from 12 countries graduated from the
EDA Helicopter Tactics Course and 43 Tactics Instructors
from 5 nations graduated from the Helicopter Tactics
Instructors Course.
In northern Europe, helicopter maintenance cooperation
appears more developed than in the western part of Europe.
Northern countries modernize their fleets and have to cope
with high infrastructure costs, especially for the newest
platforms such as the NH-90s or Black Hawks. To share costs,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden signed the 2009
Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) agreement to
promote military cooperation in the region. In addition, Finland
and Sweden recently signed a support agreement for the
maintenance of Black Hawk helicopters for 2015–2017 (with
possible extension to 2020). 
Conclusion
Helicopters are part of today’s strategic defense equipment. In
the absence of any large, multi-nation, cooperative program to
develop new military helicopters platforms in Europe, a major
risk lies in the potential loss of defense industrial and
technological knowledge, skills, and military capabilities. This
is a crucial issue for the future of European defense, where, for
example, no equivalent for the American Joint Multi-Role
Program Helicopter is identified.
This article discussed the potential roles that export
expansion, increased cooperation, dual use production, or a
focus on support and services may play in keeping European
military helicopter firms “in play.” These options are at best
medium-term solutions because sooner or later, governments
will need to replace existing platforms, notably for heavy
military helicopters. Hence, Europe has to think deeply about
how to define the role of the military helicopter of the future.
The evolution of technology can create breakthroughs at either
extreme of the market: heavy and light platforms. For medium
and heavy platforms, high-speed helicopters have become a
reality. Now flying at more than 310 km/h (the theoretical limit
of classical helicopter platforms), for many missions they will
compete with fixed-wing aircraft. This creates a new market
for helicopter manufacturers, half-way between light aircraft
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1. Terrestrial/rotary-wing concept: Marrone and Nones (2015).
2. Demand-side need increased: DGRIS-IRIS (2015). 14
countries: IISS (2016, p. 62).
3. 66 percent: Meddah (2016).
4. For historical aspects, see Sheil (1984). Sikorsky: The
United States’ first military helicopter production contract was
actually signed by Georges de Bothezat in 1921. However, it
did not lead to any actual industrial-scale production. Market
shares: The Russian platforms are in service in Central and
East European counties such as Romania, Poland, Bulgaria,
Hungary. The share of the Japanese, Indian, and Chinese firms
is insignificant.
5. Details about the history of Westland helicopters are taken
from http://history.whl.co.uk/.
6. Puma, Gazelle, Lynx: See Bousquet (2016).
7. The aim of Ditchley Park agreements (1975) was to create
coherence between helicopter needs among various European
armed forces and to reorganize the helicopter industry in
Europe. The agreements were signed by a small group of
European countries, including France, Germany, and the U.K.,
and can be considered as the historical starting point of Europe-
wide cooperation in helicopters programs.
8. Aerospatiale: See Sheil (1984).
9. H-175: This is Airbus Helicopter’s new designation for the
former EC-175, which is the same aircraft.
10. Dual-use: Marrone and Nones (2015, p. 7) write:
“‘Dual-use helicopters’ refer to platforms that have been
designed in compliance with certain standards and are
structurally built so that they can satisfy civilian, military or
security users with only minimal adjustments or additions.”
11. Contradictory: For example, heavy armor for the Army
versus high speed for the Air Force. On this paragraph, see
Belan (2016).
12. Expected to increase: James (2016).
13. Future orders: See IISS (2016).
14. Bottom-up: Droff and Bellais (2016). Dedicated training
site: DGRIS-IRIS (2015).
15. European Defense Fund: This fund has not been defined
either in its objectives or mechanisms.
and heavy helicopters. In recent years, Bell, with its V-280
Valor, and Leonardo Helicopters have invested massively in
the necessary technology. Regarding light platforms, the
evolution of technology also changes the market and here the
threat comes from the development of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle platforms. UAVs compete increasingly with light
helicopters and light aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (IRS) or even combat missions.
Europe has launched a preparatory action (EUR90 million
for 2017–2019) and planned a budget line of EUR3 billion for
upcoming 9th Framework Program for Research (FP9) starting
in 2021 (it runs over 7 years’ time). In September 2016, the
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker,
announced the creation of a European Defense Fund to support
defense investment expenditure. This might be a signal that
Europe should invest the necessary R&D funds to define and
study convergence toward common capability needs and to
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